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Abstract – This paper explores persuasion, as a speech act, in the novels of the English comic writer P.G. 
Wodehouse. Persuasion, as a topic for enquiry within linguistics, has been extensively studied, in a variety 
of social contexts (e.g. Sandell 1977; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992; Messaris 1997; Nash 1989; Hyland 1998; 
Halmari and Virtanen 2005; Charteris-Black 2006; Tardy 2011). All these studies are either general accounts 
of persuasion, or else describe its presence as a pragmatic focus in a specific social context, invoking diverse 
(pragma)-linguistic features to explain its operation. What seems, as yet, relatively under-explored, is its 
operation in everyday conversational interaction, and this paper represents a move in this direction, though 
the distinction between authentic and literary data is recognised. It uses an analytical methodology based on 
Speech Act Theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and Dialogical Pragmatics (Kecskes 2016) to explore 
instances in the novels in which Bertie Wooster, Wodehouse’s principal character, is persuaded to do 
various things. What emerges, although not a picture of authentic verbal persuasion as it would occur in 
actual interaction, but a facsimile that may shed light on some of the discursive processes involved. It is 
suggested, in fact that, at the level of pragmatics, the processes involved in authentic and literary speech acts 
are not as different as they are sometimes taken to be. 
 
Keywords: persuasion; dialogical pragmatics; speech act theory; P.G. Wodehouse; salience. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Persuasion, as a topic for enquiry within linguistics, has been extensively studied, in a 
variety of social contexts (e.g., Sandell 1977; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992; Messaris 1997; 
Nash 1989; Hyland 1998; Halmari and Virtanen 2005; Charteris-Black 2006; Tardy 2011). 
All these studies are either general accounts of persuasion, or else describe its presence as 
a pragmatic focus in a specific social context, invoking diverse (pragma)-linguistic 
features to explain its operation. What seems, as yet, relatively under-explored, is its 
operation in everyday conversational interaction, though there are methodological reasons 
why this might be so. The techniques of Conversation Analysis would seem to be suitable 
for this purpose, but there are two difficulties here. Firstly, traditional Conversation 
Analysis has been more concerned with understanding the mechanisms of conversation 
itself, rather than with developing accounts of content features (e.g., Sacks et al. 1974; 
Schegloff 1992). Secondly, its data is collected in a range of real-world contexts, and it is 
not easy to see how data exemplifying different types of ‘persuasion’ might be collected.  
It must be questioned, at the outset, whether this paucity of available data can be 
wholly remedied by recourse to literary sources. Conversational interactions in creative 
fiction are seldom viewed as authentic ‘language data’, since they clearly lack the 
necessary quality of scientific objectivity (Lehmann 2004). There are differences in the 
pragmatic goals of fictitious and actual dialogue: Urbanová (2011, p. 156) found that, 
while the former serves to reveal the inner worlds of the protagonists, focusing on their 
identity, status and psychology, the latter emphasise the phatic function, the search for 
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common ground and social contact. While Biber (2009) asks how far television 
interactions accurately capture the actual linguistic characteristics of everyday 
conversation,  Rey (2001, p. 138) says that, though television dialogue is clearly not the 
same as authentic speech, it does ‘represent the language scriptwriters imagine that real 
women and men produce’. Quaglio (2009, p. 3) argues for close similarities between the 
linguistic and functional features of natural conversation in both fictional (television) and 
authentic communication.  
From another perspective, moreover, literature offers numerous examples of 
conversational interactions that exemplify various speech acts - instances of apologies, 
insults, promises, threats, and so on - and it may be argued that, although the characters, 
situations and language are invented, the speech acts correspond in most respects to those 
found in real life. Forchini (2012, p. 37), while accepting the artificiality of movie 
conversation, argues that it shares with natural speech the capacity to express politeness, 
emotion, and attitude. It may, then, be counter-productive to ignore data from fictional 
sources simply out of respect for authenticity. 
For example, in the Life of Samuel Johnson, Boswell (1992, p. 692) describes an 
attempt to persuade Johnson to dine with John Wilkes, a prominent political figure whom 
Johnson regarded as a dangerous free-thinker. His motive, naturally, was to enjoy the 
conversation that would have followed during their meeting:  
 
I was sensible that he was sometimes a little actuated by the spirit of contradiction, and by 
means of that I hoped I should gain my point. I was persuaded that if I had come upon him 
with a direct proposal, ‘Sir, will you dine in company with Jack Wilkes?’ he would have flown 
into a passion, and would probably have answered, ‘Dine with Jack Wilkes, sir! I’d as soon 
dine with Jack Ketch.’ 
 
Boswell therefore invites Johnson to dine with a mutual acquaintance, to which he agrees, 
then hints that his acceptance might depend on his finding the company congenial. 
Johnson objects to the suggestion that he should ‘presume to dictate to a gentleman what 
company he is to have at his table’. Boswell then says that he ‘should not be surprised to 
find Jack Wilkes there’, to which Johnson retorts: ‘And if Jack Wilkes should be there, 
what is that to me, Sir?’  
Clearly, such transliterated dialogue cannot be considered as data in the same sense 
as a transcription of a conversation in a pub, for example. However, it undoubtedly 
constitutes an instance of what Oswald (2014, p. 102) refers to as ‘deceptive 
communication’ and Chilton (2004, p. 17) ‘Machiavellian communication’, where the 
propositional content is concealed from the hearer. There are practical difficulties about 
finding such examples in naturally occurring speaker interaction; the researcher would 
have to trawl through a considerable corpus of recorded speech before s/he came across a 
similar episode, or another that exemplifies so clearly one specific type of persuasion. 
Having said as much, by way of introduction to a ‘linguistic’ study based on 
‘literary’ data, the paper also follows a growing, though still rather minor, current that 
seeks to explore literature using the tools of linguistics. As Leech and Short say, the 
usefulness of linguistic analysis of literary texts is not that it may replace the reader’s 
intuition, but that it may “prompt, direct, and shape it into an understanding” (Leech and 
Short 2007, p. 4). Early landmarks in this field were works by linguists like Jakobson 
(1960) and Halliday (1971), while in Watzlawick et al. (1967), a work of more relevance 
to the current paper, a pragmatic lens is taken to Whose afraid of Virginia Woolf? The 
language of Shakespeare was the subject of a recent work (Culpeper and Ravassat 2011), 
and even P.G. Wodehouse has received critical attention (Partington 2008, 2010). 
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However, despite the efforts of a specialised journal like Language and Literature, the 
marriage announced, between literary criticism and linguistics,1 is still some way off. 
 
 
2. Persuasion in the novels of P.G. Wodehouse 
 
Most readers will probably be familiar with the Wodehouse canon and its landscape of 
human characters, mainly drawn from the ranks of the English idle rich: bachelors with 
manservants and flats in London, senile aristocrats with dwindling fortunes and nagging 
sisters; maiden aunts, tennis-playing curates, eccentric bishops, and so on. The tales of his 
extensive oeuvre mostly take place in the vanished world of Edwardian England. His most 
celebrated character is Bertie Wooster, a young dandy of private means, whose main 
desires in life relate to trivial matters such as showing off a new jacket at ‘the Drones’, the 
London club where he meets his circle of friends. He is assisted by Jeeves, an extremely 
able manservant, who is called upon to disentangle Bertie from the matrimonial or other 
imbroglios he is constantly falling into.  
Farce has been called ‘comedy with the meaning left out’ (Potts 1948, p. 151); it is 
a genre that involves ‘gross and improbable characterisation’ (Nicoll 1962, p. 88), 
‘absurd’ situations (Smith 1989, p. 5), and ‘ridiculous’ behaviour (Dean 1982, p. 482). 
The Encyclopaedia Brittanica’s definition, too, focuses on the ‘ridiculous’ situations in 
which characters appear, and this is certainly true of Wodehouse’s novels, most of which 
belong to the farcical genre (Galligan 1985). Persuasion enters the picture when a 
character objects to appearing in a ridiculous or embarassing light and needs to be talked 
into it. For example, in The Code of the Woosters, a certain Stephanie Byng, niece of 
retired magistrate Sir Watkyn Bassett, wants to marry a curate, and is reliant on her 
uncle’s consent. Curates, however, are not seen as good matches for young ladies of her 
social class, and Bertie is called on, through Jeeves’ intervention, to help persuade Bassett: 
 
“Sir Watkyn does not like you, sir.”  
“I don’t like him.” 
“No, sir. But the important thing is that he has conceived a strong distaste for you, and would 
consequently sustain a severe shock, were you to inform him that you and Miss Byng were 
betrothed and were anxious to be united in matrimony.” (Wodehouse 2011) 
 
The idea is that, when Sir Watkyn finds out later that this is untrue, his relief will be such 
that he will consent to his niece’s marriage with the curate. However, it will involve Bertie 
in an unpleasant interview, and he is understandably reluctant to co-operate. The episode 
exemplifies two instances of persuasion: Sir Watkyn must be persuaded to consent to his 
niece’s wedding, and Bertie must be persuaded to collaborate with the scheme. In the end, 
he is blackmailed into participating; and blackmail will be viewed, below, as an extreme 
form of persuasion, more accurately seen as a form of coercion. 
 
1 Journal of Language and Literature: online at https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/node/6572/download-pdf, 
last vist 12/05/17. 
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3. Speech act theory and dialogic pragmatics 
 
3.1. Persuasion as a speech act 
 
In Austin’s terms, speakers use discourse as a form of verbal action, in insults, complaints, 
promises, warnings, and so on. Words, in such cases, are used to perform a specific kind 
of action, as in the title of the well-known book, How to do things with words (Austin 
1962). Such speech acts can frequently, as in the examples just cited, be referred to in 
nominal form (an insult, etc.), but this is not possible for the speech act of persuasion: we 
cannot speak of ‘a persuade’. However, as with threats or complaints, there is clearly an 
illocutionary/perlocutionary dimension to persuasive discourse (Jucker 1997, pp. 122-
123). The distinction here, as envisaged by Austin (1962) is between the speaker’s 
intention to persuade (illocution), and the real-world effect that may be produced 
(perlocution) or, as Cap (2013, p. 53) puts it, between the illocutionary ‘force’ of a speech 
act and its perlocutionary ‘effect’. Persuasion can be attested by the fact that the target has 
either ‘taken the desired action’ or ‘admitted to a change of attitude’ (Bülow-Møller 2005, 
p. 28).  
Although persuasive speech is a feature of advertising, political speech, 
propaganda and religious discourse, it is also not uncommonly encountered in everyday 
conversation (Hardin 2010, p. 155). As Lakoff (1982, p. 11) says, persuasion can be seen 
as the ‘attempt or intention of one party to change the behavior, feelings, intentions, or 
viewpoint of another by communicative means.’ In the instances below, the speaker aims 
to get the hearer to do something (Levinson 1983, p. 240), using what, in Searle’s 
terminology, is known as a directive speech act (Searle 1969).  
An attempt to persuade can be considered in terms of four types of condition, 
described by Searle for the performance of such speech acts. Searle does not, in fact, 
consider the case of persuasion, but he does deal with requests; and such is the similarity 
between a request and an attempt to persuade that the conditions for the one transfer 
readily to the other, as shown in table one: 
 
Persuasion 
 
Propositional content: Future act A of H 
 
Preparatory:  
             
1. H is able to do A. S believes H is able to do A. 
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events, of his own 
accord 
3. H is reluctant to do A 
4. S. is not prepared to accept a first refusal from H 
 
Sincerity: S wants H to do A 
 
Essential: Counts as an attempt to get H to do A 
 
Table 1 
The speech act of persuasion (after Searle 1969: 66-67. S = speaker; H = hearer). 
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The only differences between these conditions and those for making a request are in the 
third and fourth preparatory conditions, which I have added here to Searle’s account of the 
request. A degree of reluctance to do the proposed action is necessary for us to speak of a 
speech act of persuasion, and the speaker must not be prepared simply to accept a first 
refusal from the hearer, but must, instead, bring to bear verbal or other resources to 
overcome this reluctance. 
Applying Searle’s model to the Stephanie Bing episode just discussed, the picture 
is as follows: 
 
Propositional content: Future act: Bertie telling Sir Watkyn he is engaged to Stephanie 
 
1. It is possible for Bertie to speak with Sir Watkyn, and both parties know this 
2. Bertie would not tell Sir Watkyn he wants to marry his niece, of his own accord 
3. Bertie is reluctant to collaborate (Sir Watkyn is a formidable figure and dislikes Bertie 
immensely) 
4. Stephanie is not prepared to accept his refusal, and tries to find a method to convince 
Bertie to collaborate (she blackmails him) 
 
Sincerity: Stephanie wants Bertie to talk to Sir Watkyn.  
 
Essential: Counts as an attempt to get Bertie to talk to Sir Watkyn. 
 
 
Table 2 
Speech act of persuasion in the Code of the Woosters. 
 
3.2. Dialogical communication 
 
Alongside speech act theory, the paper also draws on recent research in the pragmatics of 
communication, which has focused on dialogue, and the knowledge brought to bear by 
both speaker and hearer in conversational interaction. Kecskes (2016, p. 27) explains the 
basis of the approach: 
 
pragma-dialogue calls attention to the dialogic nature of communication by emphasizing that 
interlocutors are actors who act and react. So, the speaker-hearer not only interprets but also 
reacts to the other interlocutor’s utterance. The basic dialogic principle is that human beings 
are dialogic individuals (social individuals) who communicate in dialogic interaction not only 
by producing and understanding utterances but also by acting and reacting. 
 
Kecskes (2014, p. 24) says that, in interaction, speaker and hearer are both engaged in 
constructing models of the other’s knowledge of the situational context. Building on work 
by Bach (2007), he shows that effective communication centres around information that is 
‘mutually salient’ for both speaker and hearer (Kecskes 2016, p. 33). Thus, in the episode 
where Bertie, having consented to speak with Sir Watkyn, reveals his ‘love’ for Stephanie, 
what is salient for both speaker and hearer is the knowledge that Sir Watkyn has a strong 
dislike for Bertie: 
 
“I’m talking about me and Stiffy.” 
“Stiffy?” 
“Stephanie.” 
“Stephanie? My niece?” 
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“That’s right. Your niece. Sir Watkyn,” I said, remembering a good one, “I have the honour to 
ask you for your niece’s hand.” 
“You - what?” 
“I have the honour to ask you for your niece’s hand.” 
“I don’t understand.” 
“It’s quite simple. I want to marry young Stiffy. She wants to marry me. Surely you’ve got it 
now? Take a line through that ribbon-like seaweed.”  
There was no question as to its being value for money. On the cue ‘niece’s hand’, he had come 
out of his chair like a rocketing pheasant. (Wodehouse 2011) 
 
Bertie’s use of slang (‘young Stiffy’), is in keeping with his general character and social 
background. Such linguistic cues are viewed, below, as indexes of identity (Bucholtz and 
Hall 2005), which position the speaker as belonging to a particular social class or group 
(Oakes et al. 1994). In this case, the social group is that of the idle young rich, of whom 
Sir Watkyn disapproves. Salience and participant knowledge, therefore, are also involved 
in the humorous effect of this passage, since the reader is aware of Sir Watkyn’s attitude 
towards Bertie, and anticipates his likely response (Palmer 1994; Ermida 2008). 
 
 
4. Types of persuasion in Wodehouse novels 
 
Before returning to the Code of the Woosters for more detailed analysis, I shall discuss 
some instances of different types of persuasion in other works by Wodehouse. As Halmari 
and Virtanen (2005, p. 7) say, the persuader’s linguistic choices are based on what they 
observe, or infer, concerning the likely response of the hearer; persuasion therefore has a 
strategic aspect, where one or more types may be employed in a single instance.  
 
4.1. Coercion 
 
One of Bertie’s aunts, Aunt Agatha, frequently persuades Bertie to do things he would 
prefer not to, simply by the force of her personality. Here, for instance, she drags him 
away from the joys of Piccadilly in summer: 
 
“The curse has come upon us, Jeeves. She wants me to go and join her at – what’s the name of 
the dashed place? – at Roville-sur-mer. Oh, hang it all!” 
“I had better be packing, sir?” 
“I suppose so.” (Wodehouse 1989, p. 420) 
 
This exchange satisfies the third preparatory condition for the speech act of persuasion, in 
that Bertie’s reluctance to comply with his aunt’s wishes has been overcome, but it 
borders on another category of speech act: Bertie, in fact, is responding to a command, or 
an order, which entails another preparatory condition, i.e., that H has no choice whether to 
comply or not. Of course, Bertie does have a choice; however, the negative consequences 
of his aunt’s displeasure, if he refuses, are sufficient to rule out refusal as a practical 
possibility. In cases of coercion, the key feature is the power of the utterer with respect to 
the hearer (Chilton 2004, p. 45; see also Cialdini 2001, p. 176-180). This may be political 
or social power; or, as in this case, the psychological influence of one of the participants.  
For the same pragmatic reasons, blackmail, a frequent device in Wodehouse’s 
novels, as we shall see below, can be seen as an extreme form of persuasion, given that in 
most cases the hearer has no real choice over whether to comply with the speaker’s 
proposition. 
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4.2. Threats 
 
Another persuasive resource which gives the recipient few responsive options is the threat, 
which can also be seen in terms of an attempt to oblige the hearer to co-operate by means 
of methods which are, strictly speaking, more coercive than persuasive. However, if we 
observe the conditions for the speech act of threatening, we will see points of contact with 
those for persuading: 
 
Threaten 
 
Propositional content: Future act A of H ; Future act B of S 
 
Preparatory:  1. H is able to do A, and S to do B.  
                         S believes H is able to do A, and H believes S is able to do B. 
                         2. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal          
                          course of events. 
                         3. B is something that H would prefer not to happen.  
                         4. Negative consequences are announced or mutually known, if H does not do A. 
 
Sincerity: S wants H to do A.  
 
Essential: Counts as an attempt to get H to do A. 
 
 
Table 3 
Conditions for the speech act of threatening. 
 
Bertie Wooster is fond of fine cuisine, and another aunt has a wonderful French cook. 
Whenever Dahlia wants to get Bertie to do something for her, she can often persuade him 
by means of a threat to ban him from her table, as in the following example: 
 
“It seems to me a dashed lot to do for a loved aunt, and I’m jolly well not going to dream - “  
“Oh yes you are, because you know what will happen, if you don’t.” She paused significantly. 
“You follow me, Watson? Well, there it is. Perform this simple, easy task for me, or guests at 
my dinner table will be saying: “Why is it that we never seem to see Bertie Wooster here any 
more? Bless my soul, what an amazing lunch that was that Anatole gave us yesterday!” 
(Wodehouse 1989, pp. 216-17) 
 
The persuasive force of any threat depends on its perceived strength, from the hearer’s 
perspective. In this case Bertie is being asked to steal something, with a real risk that a 
spell in prison will result from his failure. It is characteristic of his general outlook on life 
that he sees Aunt Dahlia’s threat as giving him no choice but to obey her wishes.2 
 
2  This subversion of regulative social norms is, arguably, central to the humour of P.G. Wodehouse. The 
behavioural codes associated with Bertie’s old school (Eton) are frequently contrasted with the laws of the 
land. Offences such as stealing a policeman’s helmet, on Boat Race night, are viewed as pranks that raise 
the miscreant’s social esteem among his fellows. It is entirely consistent with Wooster’s behavioural codes 
that the prospect of banishment from Anatole’s cooking is sufficient to make him break the law.    
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4.3. Blackmail and emotional blackmail 
 
Wodehouse’s novels frequently contain instances of blackmail, a persuasive/coercive 
resource in which the hearer is compelled to act in a way s/he would rather not because the 
persuader knows a damaging secret about them. An important character in The Code of the 
Woosters, for example, is Roderick Spode, a caricature of a 1930s dictator, who threatens 
Bertie and his friends with physical violence, and is ultimately brought under control by 
Jeeves discovering that he secretly designs ladies’ underwear for a store in London. As 
Bertie puts it: 
 
“You can’t be a successful dictator and design women’s underclothing.” 
“No, sir.” 
“One or the other. Not both.” (Wodehouse 2011) 
 
Ordinary blackmail is persuasive because of the loss of face that would result to the 
recipient from a revelation of his secret. The emotional kind operates by creating 
psychological tension in the hearer. The blackmailer suggests that s/he ‘ought’ to do 
something they are reluctant to do, appealing to factors in the hearer’s psychological 
make-up that relate to ethical codes, principles and so forth. Failure to do the required 
thing will entail a loss of self-esteem. Bertie went to Eton in the Edwardian period, and 
absorbed a certain code of behaviour, the morality expressed in phrases like ‘play the 
game’, ‘not cricket’, and ‘never let the side down’ (Gathorne-Hardy 1978). In The Code of 
the Woosters, he is persuaded to own up to stealing a policeman’s helmet - and thereby 
risk being sent to prison: 
 
“Bertie, surely you aren’t going to be difficult about this? You’re much too good a sport. 
Didn’t you tell me once that the code of the Woosters was ‘Never let a pal down’”? She had 
found the talking point. People who appeal to the code of the Woosters rarely fail to touch a 
chord in Bertram.’ (Wodehouse 2011) 
 
Again, it is characteristic of Bertie’s general approach to life that it is more important to 
him to be seen as a ‘good sport’ than to obey the laws of the land. 
 
4.4. Aristotelian factors: Ethos, Pathos and Logos 
 
It is also of interest to view persuasion in Wodehouse’s novels through an Aristotelian 
lens, using the well-known categories of Ethos, Pathos and Logos (Aristotle 1954), an 
approach that still has a place in modern discourse analysis (Gurak 1999; Biber et al. 
2007). Ethos is that respect due to the character of the speaker, as Aristotle (1954, p. 25) 
wrote: “Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so 
spoken as to make us think him credible”. To observe it in operation, we need first to 
focus briefly on the complex plot of another novel, The Inimitable Jeeves. One of Bertie’s 
friends, Bingo Little, wants to marry a waitress, something which his bed-ridden uncle, on 
whose financial support Bingo depends, would deplore. Jeeves suggests that Bingo read 
the uncle romantic stories where marriages defy class conventions, to prepare him to 
accept his nephew’s plans. Bingo tells his uncle that Bertie is the author of the stories, 
operating under a pseudonym to avoid publicity. Since the uncle has conceived a profound 
respect for the writer, his ethos with the sick man is raised, to the point where the 
following exchange takes place: 
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“You think it’s all right for a chappie in what you might call a certain social position to marry 
a girl of what you might describe as the lower classes?” 
“Most assuredly I do, Mr Wooster.” 
I took a deep breath, and slipped him the good news. 
“Young Bingo - your nephew, don’t you know - wants to marry a waitress,” I said. 
“I honour him for it”, said old Little. (Wodehouse 1989, p. 417) 
 
Aristotle (1954, p. 25) wrote that “persuasion may come through the hearers, when the 
speech stirs their emotions”; this represents the ‘pathos’ component of persuasive rhetoric. 
In a later episode, Bertie is asked to heal a rift between Bingo and his uncle, who still 
believes Bertie to be his favourite authoress, and thereby bring about the restoration of 
Bingo’s allowance. Bertie explains the reason for his visit, and is waiting for Mr Little to 
reply. Meanwhile, Mr Little is reading: 
 
He toyed with the book, and it fell open at page two hundred and fifteen. I couldn’t remember 
what was on page two hundred and fifteen, but it must have been something tolerably zippy, 
for his expression changed and he gazed up at me with misty eyes, as if he’d taken a shade too 
much mustard with his last bite of ham. 
“Very well, Mr Wooster,” he said. (Wodehouse 1989, p. 570)  
 
Mr Little becomes ‘misty-eyed’, softened by some pathetic emotion, and he is persuaded 
to give his consent, although persuasion here is clearly also due to Mr Little’s respect for 
Bertie’s ethos as the (supposed) author of this moving fiction.  
Finally, there is the appeal to ‘logos’, or rational argument, which Aristotle (1954, p. 
25) considered the principal of the three factors. He says that truths, or apparent truths, 
must be proved by means of “the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question”. In 
the following extract from The Inimitable Jeeves, Aunt Agatha adds rational argument to 
her coercive personality: 
 
“It is young men like you, Bertie, who make the person with the future of the race at heart 
despair. Cursed with too much money, you fritter away in idle selfishness a life which might 
have been made useful, helpful and profitable. You do nothing but waste your time on 
frivolous pleasures. You are simply an anti-social animal, a drone. Bertie, it is imperative that 
you marry [...] You should be breeding children to – ” (Wodehouse 1981, p. 25) 
 
This fragment is a kind of enthymeme, since the argument contains an implicit 
proposition, as follows: 
 
SINCE: Bertie is wasting a potentially useful life in idle selfishness  
 
And SINCE: (implicit preposition) a useful life is one that involves marriage and bringing up 
children 
 
THEREFORE: Bertie should get married 
 
The persuasive force of such arguments rests, in part, on the perceived level of their 
logical coherence, and on the degree that the perception is shared between speaker and 
hearer. Since Bertie and his aunt do not share the same notion of what constitutes a useful 
life, it is unlikely that he will be convinced by this argument. Therefore, his subsequent 
co-operation with his aunt’s wishes in this matter must be explained by some other factor; 
in this case, the force of her personality. 
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5. Speech acts and dialogical pragmatics in The Code of the 
Woosters 
 
We can now return to the scene in The Code of the Woosters (Wodehouse 2011) where 
Stephanie, having persuaded Bertie to prepare the ground for her, presents her uncle with 
other arguments to support her attempt to convince him that she should marry the curate. 
Analysis will focus on the most salient feature of the shared knowledge each participant 
brings to the argumentation, together with analysis of the speech act/s involved.3  
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Sir Watkyn 
 
Stephanie 
‘In the first place, you are far too young - ‘ 
 
‘What nonsense. Three of the girls I was at school with were 
married last year. I’m senile compared with some of the infants 
you see toddling up the aisle nowadays.’  
Stephanie’s age 
 
Table 4 
Extract one. 
 
The speech act here is an instance of ‘counter-argument’, advanced by Sir Watkyn, to his 
niece’s argument, that she should be allowed to marry the curate. The salient discursive 
feature is her age, and the two clearly disagree over a proposition which remains at an 
implicit level during this exchange. Seen from Sir Watkyn’s point of view this can be 
stated: since Stephanie is below the age at which she is able to decide for herself, I must 
decide for her. From Stephanie’s point of view, it is as follows: since I am old enough to 
decide for myself who I marry, I alone must make the decision. Kecskes (2016) uses the 
terms ‘utterer implicature’ and ‘hearer implicature’ to express the meanings the speaker 
wishes to convey, and what the hearer understands, respectively. Sometimes lack of 
convergence in this sense may produce misunderstandings; here, it produces lack of 
agreement and the persuasive attempt fails. 
In terms of argumentation theory, Stephanie produces what Toulmin (1958) calls 
‘backing’ for her contention that she is old enough to decide for herself by mentioning the 
fact that younger girls than her are getting married. Sir Watkyn, meanwhile has, in support 
of his contention, the circumstance that he is legally responsible for Stephanie. This real-
world fact concerning the relationship between the two participants is salient throughout 
the exchange; since, if it were not so, there would be no need for any persuasive attempt to 
be made.  
  
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
 
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
‘But what have you got against Harold?’ 
‘I have nothing, as you put it, against him. He seems zealous in his 
duties and popular in the parish - ‘ 
‘He’s a baa-lamb.’ 
‘No doubt.’  
Harold is a curate 
 
Table 5 
Extract two. 
 
 
3 For reasons of space, the speech acts will not be presented in the same detail as above but will simply be 
identified.  
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In a speech act we might term ‘interrogation’, Stephanie shifts the argument to the 
suitability of Harold as a possible husband. The way she frames the question attributes bad 
motives to Sir Watkyn, implying that his disapproval is due to some unreasonable 
prejudice on his part. Sir Watkyn’s reply wards off the implicit reproof, and he shows he 
has no ill-will towards Harold by praising his zeal and acknowledging his popularity. 
However, he does so in a way that underlines Harold’s social position - his duties, both 
parties know, are those of a curate, and his popularity is circumscribed to that specific 
social sphere, referenced by Sir Watkyn via the phrase ‘in the parish’. At this point, what 
is salient for both participants is the fact that ‘Harold is a curate’. The next contribution 
from Stephanie attempts to shift Harold from that social role; to be a ‘baa-lamb’ is not a 
typical attribute of a curate. It is an expression of her affection for him, thereby 
positioning him as a possible romantic partner, and Sir Watkyn’s cool response is a rebuff, 
leading Stephanie to change tack:  
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
‘He played football for England.’ 
‘Very possibly.’ 
Harold is a curate 
 
Table 6 
Extract three. 
 
The speech act Stephanie performs here is ‘providing information’. The salient fact, as in 
the last extract, is that Harold is a curate. By providing this information about him, 
Stephanie aims to show her uncle that Harold is no ordinary curate: since very few curates 
play football for England, he must have special talents. These talents, she implies, raise 
him from the social category of ‘curate’ to a more promising category, that of ‘possible 
husband’. Sir Watkyn’s curt reply implies recognition, but rejects this utterer implicature. 
The utterer implicature of his ‘very possibly’ can be summarised as follows: he may have 
played football for England, but he’s still only a curate. 
The same analysis applies, mutatis mutandis, to Stephanie’s next attempt: 
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
‘And he’s marvellous at tennis.’ 
‘I dare say he is. But that is not a reason why he should marry my 
niece’. 
Harold is a curate 
 
Table 7 
Extract four. 
 
In a speech act of ‘asking for information’, Sir Watkyn now moves the argument onto a 
practical topic: 
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Sir Watkyn 
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
Stephanie 
What means has he, if any, beyond his stipend?’ 
‘About five hundred a year.’ 
‘Tchah!’ 
‘Well, I don’t call that bad. Five hundred’s pretty good sugar, if 
you ask me.  
Harold is a curate 
 
Table 8 
Extract five. 
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Once again, the salient fact here relates to Harold’s occupation, underlined by Sir 
Watkyn’s use of the term ‘stipend’, which relates to the moneys received by a clergyman, 
and thereby explicitly positions Harold in this social group. The implicature of his 
expletive at Stephanie’s response conveys the meaning: that is hardly sufficient for him to 
be making matrimonial plans. Stephanie’s response shows that she has understood this 
meaning, and attempts to rebuff it. 
In the next move, speaker and hearer shift to a discussion of the importance of 
money. The implicature of Stephanie’s first contribution, in the speech act of ‘assertion’, 
is that the reason Sir Watkyn objects to her marrying Harold is his lack of money: 
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
Stephanie 
Sir Watkyn 
Stephanie 
‘Besides, money doesn’t matter.’ 
‘It matters a great deal.’ 
‘You really feel that, do you?’ 
‘Certainly. You must be practical.’ 
‘Right ho, I will. If you’d rather I married for money, I’ll marry 
for money. Bertie, it’s on. Start getting measured for the 
wedding trousers.’  
Money is an 
important factor in 
matrimony 
 
Sir Watkyn does not 
like Bertie 
 
Table 9 
Extract six. 
 
At this point, Stephanie plays her trump card, exploiting her knowledge of Sir Watkyn’s 
deep dislike of Bertie. Effectively, she presents her uncle with an argument that is a type 
of ‘false alternatives’ logical fallacy (Damer 2005, p. 126), because her implicature is: 
since you are preventing me from marrying the man I love, I will marry a man whom I 
know you dislike intensely - the choice is yours. However, this is by no means a watertight 
argument, and Sir Watkyn, if he were able to think clearly, might have objected that other 
alternatives besides marrying Bertie could be available. Clearly, however, the shock 
produced by Stephanie’s move of re-introducing Bertie as a possible partner is 
considerable, and leads to her final victory in the argument: 
 
Speaker Dialogue Salience  
Stephanie 
 
 
 
 
Sir Watkyn 
‘Bertie is rolling in the stuff and, as you suggest, one might do 
worse than take a whack at the Wooster millions. Of course, Bertie 
dear, I am only marrying you to make you happy. I can never love 
you as I love Harold. But as Uncle Watkyn has taken this violent 
prejudice against him - ‘ 
‘My dear child, don’t talk such nonsense. You are quite mistaken. 
You must have completely misunderstood me. I have no prejudice 
against this young man Pinker. I like and respect him. If you really 
think your happiness lies in becoming his wife, I would be the last 
man to stand in your way. By all means, marry him. The 
alternative - ‘ 
Sir Watkyn does 
not like Bertie 
 
Table 10 
Extract seven. 
 
It is noticeable here that Sir Watkyn, for the first time, alters his representation of Harold, 
from terms that position him as ‘a curate’ to the phrase ‘this young man Pinker’; 
acknowledging, that is, that he has some existence beyond his lowly social role. By adding 
that he ‘likes and respects him’, moreover, he implicitly raises Harold’s social prestige to 
the level at which he becomes an acceptable suitor for his niece.  
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There may, then, be a cumulative dimension to persuasion; it is not clear if 
Stephanie would have achieved her purpose if she had begun her persuasive attempt with 
her final, conclusive argument. There may be something to be said for engaging in 
manoeuvres during an argument, in an exchange of micro-moves of attack and defence, so 
that the interlocutor’s resistance is progressively lowered. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In terms of the above-mentioned debate over the status of literature as linguistic data, I 
hope the foregoing analysis has shown that literary examples may have a role to play in 
studies of the mechanisms of conversation or, as here, of persuasive argumentation. 
Although the dialogues are clearly invented, the operation of salience, and of the other 
pragma-dialogical features, are arguably analogous to that of the same features of 
authentic conversation or argument.  Kecskes himself makes frequent use of data from 
television shows or films. Literary and other types of fiction, at times, present interactions 
of this kind in a form which lends itself to the kind of analysis carried out here. As was 
said at the outset, it is not easy to see how one might collect authentic data that would 
permit a similar analysis. 
By focusing on the dialogical pragmatics involved in speech acts, at the level of 
single moves in argumentation, we have seen how effects at the pragmatic level depend on 
the interplay between utterer and hearer implicature. We have also seen the usefulness of 
salience as an analytical tool: speaker and hearer orient their understanding of what is 
going on in interaction around a shared dimension of mutual knowledge, whose contours 
are delineated by the blend of speaker/hearer implicature, and which shift as the dialogue 
progresses. Salience not only accounts for the pragmatic operation of the processes 
whereby exchanges of meaning occur in conversational action, but it also represents a 
basic tool whereby such processes may be appreciated by the analyst.  
Persuasion, in this study, emerges as a complex convergence of speaker and hearer, 
around propositions that frequently remain at an implicit level. The successful persuader 
tries various argumentative approaches until s/he finds the right key to unlock the hearer’s 
resistance. This clearly involves not simply mastery of a range of persuasive techniques 
but also a deep knowledge of what Jeeves generally terms ‘the psychology of the 
individual’. 
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